Ex-Agents Expose Secret Service’s Critical Failures on Jan 6

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Ex-Agents Expose Secret Service’s Critical Failures on Jan 6

Former Secret Service agents have spoken out to expose significant failures in the federal agency’s handling of the protests at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.

A recent report highlights critical failures in the Secret Service’s handling of Jan. 6, revealing deeper issues within the agency, The Daily Caller reported.

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Inspector General has detailed the Secret Service’s severe lapses during Jan. 6.

The failures include a near-miss incident involving then-Vice President-elect Kamala Harris and an undetected pipe bomb.

On July 31, the DHS’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) released a report criticizing the Secret Service for inadequate preparation and coordination with other law enforcement agencies during the Capitol protests.

This event marked one of the most significant breaches of security in recent U.S. history.

The report stemmed from a thorough investigation into the events surrounding Jan. 6.

The chaos resulted in a dire security situation that was exacerbated by poor communication and coordination among federal agencies.

According to the OIG report, there were significant lapses in intelligence gathering and sharing, particularly concerning the potential threats that day.

This included an overlooked intelligence packet that failed to reach the Secret Service, highlighting a communication breakdown.

Dean Peterson, a former Secret Service agent, expressed concerns about the agency’s readiness and the miscalculation of necessary manpower, which he attributed to both the Secret Service and the Capitol Police.

“The bottom line that caused it all is, whether it’s a combination of the Capitol Police and the Secret Service or ultimately, the entity responsible for protection, were not prepared, or did not anticipate accurately, the necessary manpower,” Peterson told the Caller.

This sentiment was echoed by other former agents who observed that the day’s failures highlighted critical vulnerabilities within the agency’s structure and leadership.

Michael Matranga, another former agent, criticized the 72-hour rule for deploying the Explosives Ordnance Disposal team as illogical, especially in urgent protection scenarios.

On the day of the protests, two pipe bombs were discovered near the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Republican National Committee (RNC).

Harris reportedly came within 20 feet of one of the bombs at the DNC, underscoring the grave security risks that were not adequately addressed.

The Secret Service’s Operations Unit’s failure to request immediate Explosive Ordnance Disposal support was heavily criticized.

The purported requirement for a 72-hour advance notice hindered a swift response, even though there had been instances of last-minute approvals in the past.

“Regardless if it’s 72 hours or not, the job still needs to get done,” Matranga emphasized in an interview with the Daily Caller.

“If we’ve got a protectee that’s traveling to a location, the whole 72-hour thing, to me doesn’t make sense.”

The OIG report also noted a delayed deployment of additional officers to assist the Capitol Police.

An email timed at 3:47 p.m. from the Secret Service claimed that 100 officers were dispatched to the Capitol with another 100 to follow.

However, there was nearly an hour-and-a-half delay in their deployment, which was critical in the rapidly unfolding events.

Despite the agency’s claim of full cooperation with the investigation and the implementation of most of the OIG’s recommendations, the Secret Service rejected the proposal to develop protocols for providing emergency support during civil disturbances.

This decision has sparked further debate among law enforcement experts and former agency personnel about the necessity of revising current policies.

Intelligence and communication breakdowns were a recurring theme in the inspector general’s findings, indicating a need for the Secret Service to take on a more prominent role in intelligence sharing to prevent similar failures in the future.